000			01740nab a2200265 c 4500
999			_c146646 _d146646
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20221028121948.0
007			ta
008			221028t2022 ne ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
245		0	_aRevenue effects of the Global Minimum Tax under Pillar two _c Mona Baraké, Paul-Emmanuel Chouc, Theresa Neef & Gabriel Zucman
500			_aResumen.
500			_aApéndice.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aThe article present simulations of the revenue effects of the GloBE minimum tax. Two possible scenarios are considered, i.e., one in which the IIR is adopted by the headquarters country and another concerning the adoption of the QDMTT in source jurisdictions – the host country of the foreign MNE affiliates. Their analysis accentuates how the distribution of revenues varies depending on which country has the priority to collect them. Under the IIR, the more headquartered multinationals that a country has, the more revenues it receives. With the QDMTT that grants the host country the priority in collecting the top-up tax, low-tax jurisdictions that have attracted affiliates of many multinationals could be among the main beneficiaries of the reform. The authors also find that the least developed countries gain no or very limited revenues under either scenario.
650		4	_967772 _aSEGUNDO PILAR (OCDE)
650		4	_aEMPRESAS MULTINACIONALES _943600
650		4	_aIMPUESTOS _947460
650		4	_967681 _aTIPO MÍNIMO GLOBAL
650		4	_948197 _aRECAUDACION
650		4	_aAPLICACION _927355
700	1		_970143 _aBaraké, Mona
773	0		_9168245 _oOP 2141/2022/10 _tIntertax _w(IEF)55619 _x 0165-2826 _g v. 50, n. 10, October 2022, p. 689-710
942			_cART