000 01590nab a2200289 c 4500
999 _c146610
_d146610
003 ES-MaIEF
005 20221020183504.0
007 ta
008 221020t2022 us ||||| |||| 00| ||eng d
040 _aES-MaIEF
_bspa
_cES-MaIEF
100 1 _aCarozzi, Felipe
_970122
245 1 0 _aPolitical fragmentation and government stability
_bevidence from local governments in Spain
_c by Felipe Carozzi, Davide Cipullo and Luca Repetto
500 _aResumen
504 _aBibliografía
520 _aThis paper studies how political fragmentation affects government stability. Using a regression discontinuity design, we show that each additional party with representation in the local parliament increases the probability that the incumbent government is unseated by 5 percentage points. The entry of an additional party affects stability by reducing the probability of a single-party majority and increasing the instability of governments when such a majority is not available. We interpret our results in light of a bargaining model of coalition formation featuring government instability.
650 4 _aPOLITICA
_948047
650 4 _aGOBIERNO
_944995
650 4 _aPARTIDOS POLITICOS
_947972
650 4 _aPARLAMENTOS REGIONALES
_947963
650 4 _aANALISIS DE DATOS
_925830
650 4 _aVARIABLES ESTADISTICAS
_948670
650 4 _aESPAÑA
_941092
700 1 _aCipullo, Davide
_969188
700 1 _aRepetto, Luca
_970123
773 0 _9168188
_oOP 2134/2022/2
_tAmerican Economic Journal : Applied Economics
_w(IEF)82246
_x 1945-7782
_gv. 14, n. 2, April 2022, p. 23-50
942 _cART