000			01605nab a2200289 c 4500
999			_c146602 _d146602
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20221020123947.0
007			ta
008			221020t2022 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100			_962982 _aGross, Till
245		0	_aDynamic capital tax competition under the source principle _c by Till Gross, Paul Klein and Miltiadis Makris
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aWe explore the short- and long-run implications of tax competition between jurisdictions, where governments can only tax capital at source. We do this in the context of a neoclassical growth model under commitment and capital mobility. We provide a new theoretical perspective on the dynamic capital tax externalities that emerge in this model. Numerically, we show that the net capital tax externality is positive in the short run but converges to zero in the long run. We also find that noncooperative source-based capital taxes are initially positive and slowly decline toward zero.
650			_aCAPITAL _933516
650		4	_948255 _aRENDIMIENTOS DE CAPITAL
650			_aIMPUESTOS _947460
650		4	_940318 _aCOMPETENCIA FISCAL NOCIVA
650		4	_947812 _aMOVIMIENTO DE CAPITALES
650		4	_963148 _aEROSIÓN DE LA BASE IMPONIBLE Y TRASLADO DE BENEFICIOS
650		4	_947776 _aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
700	1		_970119 _aKlein, Paul
700			_951321 _aMakris, Miltiadis
773	0		_9168184 _oOP 2137/2022/3 _tAmerican Economic Journal : Macroeconomics _w(IEF)64915 _x 1945-7707 _g v. 14, n. 3, July 2022, p. 365-410
942			_cART