000 01682nab a2200289 c 4500
999 _c146600
_d146600
003 ES-MaIEF
005 20221020120950.0
007 ta
008 221020t2022 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040 _aES-MaIEF
_bspa
_cES-MaIEF
100 _956232
_aKindermann, Fabian
245 0 _aHigh marginal tax rates on the top 1 percent?
_blessons from a life-cycle model with idiosyncratic income risk
_c by Fabian Kindermann and Dirk Krueger
500 _aResumen.
504 _aBibliografía.
520 _aThis paper argues that high marginal labor income tax rates on top earners are an effective tool for social insurance even when households have high labor supply elasticity, households make dynamic savings decisions, and policies have general equilibrium effects. We construct a large-scale overlapping generations model with uninsurable labor productivity risk, show that it has a realistic wealth distribution, and numerically characterize the optimal top marginal rate. We find that marginal tax rates for top 1 percent earners of 79 percent are optimal as long as the model earnings and wealth distributions display a degree of concentration as observed in US data.
650 4 _947319
_aRENTAS ALTAS
650 4 _aIMPUESTOS
_947460
650 4 _948570
_aTIPOS DE GRAVAMEN
650 7 _954834
_aINCREMENTO
650 7 _948219
_aREDISTRIBUCION
650 7 _943299
_aELASTICIDAD IMPOSITIVA
650 7 _966273
_aRIESGO FISCAL
650 4 _947776
_aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
700 _92395
_aKrueger, Dirk
773 0 _9168183
_oOP 2137/2022/2
_tAmerican Economic Journal : Macroeconomics
_w(IEF)64915
_x 1945-7707
_g v. 14, n. 2, April 2022, p. 319-366
942 _cART