000			01830nab a2200253 c 4500
999			_c146463 _d146463
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20220927120342.0
007			ta
008			220927t2022 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_969511 _aEmmenegger, Patrick
245		0	_aDirect democracy, coalition size and public spending _c Patrick Emmenegger, Lucas Leemann and André Walter
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aThis article contributes to the literature on direct democracy and public spending in two ways. First, we explore how direct democratic institutions interact with a specific aspect of the representative system, the size of the governing coalition, to influence public spending. Second, based on newly collected data, we examine the relationship between three different direct democratic institutions, coalition size and public spending over the period from 1860 to 2015. Empirically, we find that initiatives increase the size of the public sector under single-party governments, but this positive relationship disappears as coalition size increases. In contrast, we find that financial referendums slow down the growth of public spending, while law referendums are not systematically associated with public spending. Finally, we find that the relationship between direct democratic institutions, coalition size and public spending does not change over time despite the long period under investigation
650		4	_944787 _aGASTO PUBLICO
650			_aDEMOCRACIA _941808
650		4	_944995 _aGOBIERNO
650		4	_947972 _aPARTIDOS POLITICOS
700	1		_970040 _aLeemann, Lucas
700			_957120 _aWalter, Andrew
773	0		_9168002 _oOP 1793/2022/2 _tJournal of Public Policy _w(IEF)17584 _x 0143-814X _g v. 42, Issue 2, June 2022, p. 224-246
942			_cART