000			01552nab a2200241 c 4500
999			_c145967 _d145967
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20220606180040.0
007			ta
008			220606t2022 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_969804 _aTilipman, Nicholas
245		0	_aEmployer incentives and distortions in health insurance design _bimplications for welfare and costs _c Nicholas Tilipman
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aThis paper studies employer incentives in designing health insurance provider networks and whether observed offerings reflect preferences that are aligned with employees. I estimate a model of supply and demand where I endogenize employer health plan offerings with respect to hospital and physician networks. I find that employers "overprovide" broad networks by overweighting the preferences of certain employees, specifically older workers and those in regions with less provider competition, over the preferences of the average employee household. Shifting employers toward offering different provider networks in different geographic markets could yield substantial gains to surplus, with minimal distributional or selection effects.
650		4	_948380 _aSEGUROS DE SALUD
650			_aTRABAJADORES _947884
650		4	_947461 _aINCENTIVOS
650		4	_944933 _aGASTOS SANITARIOS
650		4	_aESTADOS UNIDOS _942888
773	0		_9167334 _oOP 234/2022/3 _tThe American Economic Review _w(IEF)103372 _x 0002-8282 _g v. 112, n. 3, March 2022, p. 998-1037
942			_cART