000			01853nab a2200265 c 4500
999			_c145960 _d145960
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20220606163649.0
007			ta
008			220606t2022 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_969801 _aBuchs, Aurélia
245		0	_aFiscal performance and the re‑election of finance ministers _bevidence from the Swiss cantons _c Aurélia Buchs, Nils Soguel
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aUsing data from 225 cantonal government elections over the 1980–2019 period in Switzerland, we estimate the effect of fiscal performance on the vote share of finance ministers seeking re-election. Our estimations show that finance ministers benefit statistically and electorally from balancing fiscal accounts and presenting budget surpluses. Improving the fiscal balance by 1000 Swiss francs per inhabitant in the pre-election year raises the electoral result of a finance minister by 1.4–5.4 percentage points from the vote share of her previous election. We present evidence for politician-specific monitoring: the finance minister—in contrast to the spending ministers—seems to be the sole member of government who benefits, electorally, from debt reduction. Correcting for possible selection phenomena, our results suggest that the electoral effect of fiscal performance may not be caused by a selection bias but rather by the office of the finance ministry itself.
650			_aPOLITICA FISCAL _948067
650		4	_941783 _aDEFICIT PUBLICO
650		4	_948220 _aREDUCCION
650		4	_943408 _aELECCIONES
650		4	_947758 _aMINISTROS DE HACIENDA
650			_aSUIZA _948486
700			_96284 _aSoguel, Nils
773	0		_9167345 _oOP 1443/2022/191/1/2 _tPublic Choice _w(IEF)124378 _x 0048-5829 _g v. 191, n. 1-2, April 2022, p. 31-49
942			_cART