000			01601nab a2200241 c 4500
999			_c145848 _d145848
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20220511134946.0
007			ta
008			220510t2022 gw ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_969753 _aChugunova, Marina
245		0	_aRedistribution and production with a subsistence income constraint _ba real-effort experiment _c Marina Chugunova, Andreas Nicklisch and Kai-Uwe Schnapp
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aA large body of experimental studies demonstrates that redistribution leads to inefficiencies due to distorted work incentives. Yet, this finding is typically obtained in environments where people are unconstrained in their labor-leisure allocation decisions. In this paper we study labor supply decisions in a framework with a subsistence income constraint and a redistribution system that supports disadvantaged members of a society in meeting the constraint. We document that while high-talent taxpayers perform equally well in all conditions, the less talented ones significantly decrease their performance in response to the introduction of the tax. The negative effect of taxation is mitigated if an income threshold is present and the tax is spent meaningfully.
650			_aIMPUESTOS _947460
650			_aRENTA _950200
650		4	_aREDISTRIBUCION _948219
700	1		_969754 _aNicklisch, Andreas
700	1		_969755 _aSchnapp, Kai-Uwe, Schnapp
773	0		_9167145 _oOP 207/2022/1/2 _tFinanzArchiv _w(IEF)21244 _x 0015-2218 _g v. 78, n. 1-2, March/June 2022, p. 208-238
942			_cART