000			02159nab a2200277 c 4500
999			_c145776 _d145776
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20220406171402.0
007			ta
008			220406s2022 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_969717 _aMurtinu, Samuele
245		0	_aRational inattention and politics _bhow parties use fiscal policies to manipulate voters _c Samuele Murtinu, Giulio Piccirilli, Agnese Sacchi
260			_f2022
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aWe model a two-party electoral game with rationally inattentive voters. Parties are endowed with different administrative competencies and announce a fiscal platform to be credibly implemented in case of electoral success. The budgetary impact of each platform depends on the party’s competence and on a stochastic implementation shock. Voters rely on the announced platform to infer a party’s unobserved competence. In addition, voters receive noisy signals on the impact of each fiscal platform with noise depending ultimately on a voter’s cognitive skills. We predict that the interplay between the desire of parties to win the election (the incentive to manipulate voters’ beliefs) and voters’ (lack of) cognitive skills (the scope for manipulation) distorts fiscal policies towards excessive budget deficits. The mechanism is that parties attempt to manipulate inferences on their competencies by implementing a loose fiscal policy. The predictions are tested empirically on a sample of advanced economies over years 1999–2008. Our results remain stable after controlling for potentially confounding differences across countries and over time, along with unobserved heterogeneity. Finally,
650			_aPOLITICA FISCAL _948067
650		4	_947972 _aPARTIDOS POLITICOS
650		4	_aVOTO _955164
650		4	_941783 _aDEFICIT PUBLICO
650		4	_947776 _aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
700	1		_969718 _aPiccirilli, Giulio
700			_955945 _aSacchi, Agnese
773	0		_9167095 _dDordrecht Kluwer 1966 _oOP 1443/2022/3/4 _tPublic Choice _w(IEF)124378 _x 0048-5829 _gv. 190, n. 3-4, March 2022, p. 365-386
942			_cART