000 | 01338nab a2200229 c 4500 | ||
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999 |
_c145713 _d145713 |
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003 | ES-MaIEF | ||
005 | 20220323183137.0 | ||
007 | ta | ||
008 | 220323t2022 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d | ||
040 |
_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF |
||
100 |
_966547 _aTazhitdinova, Alisa |
||
245 | 0 |
_aIncreasing hours worked _bmoonlighting responses to a large tax reform _c by Alisa Tazhitdinova |
|
260 | _c2022 | ||
500 | _aResumen. | ||
504 | _aBibliografía. | ||
520 | _aMoonlighting is increasingly popular in OECD countries, with 5 to 10 percent of workers holding two or more jobs. However, little is known about the responsiveness of moonlighting to financial incentives due to the lack of identifying variation. This paper studies a unique reform in Germany that allowed workers to hold small secondary jobs tax-free, decreasing the marginal tax rate by between 19.5 to 66 pp. I show that the reform resulted in a dramatic increase in moonlighting that was not offset by reductions in primary earnings and that hours constraints are a key determinant of moonlighting. | ||
650 | 4 |
_aPLURIEMPLEO _969695 |
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650 | 4 |
_aIMPUESTOS _947460 |
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650 | 4 |
_aALEMANIA _925193 |
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773 | 0 |
_9166967 _oOP 2135/2022/1 _tAmerican Economic Journal : Economic Policy _w(IEF)134825 _x 1945-7731 _gv. 14, n. 1, February 2022, p. 473-500 |
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942 | _cART |