000			01626nab a2200301 c 4500
999			_c145535 _d145535
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20220315140813.0
007			ta
008			220315t2022 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100			_957191 _aBierbrauer, Felix
245		0	_aTaxes and turnout _bwhen the decisive voter stays at home _c Felix Bierbrauer, Aleh Tsyvinski, Nicolas Werquin
260			_c2022
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aWe develop a model of political competition with endogenous turn-out and endogenous platforms. Parties trade off incentivizing their supporters to vote and discouraging the supporters of the competing party from voting. We show that the latter objective is particularly pronounced for a party with an edge in the political race. Thus, an increase in political support for a party may lead to the adoption of policies favoring its opponents so as to asymmetrically demobilize them. We study the implications for the political economy of redistributive taxation. Equilibrium tax policy is typically aligned with the interest of voters who are demobilized.
650		4	_948067 _aPOLITICA FISCAL
650		4	_aREDISTRIBUCION _948219
650		4	_aRENTA _950200
650		4	_947972 _aPARTIDOS POLITICOS
650		4	_955164 _aVOTO
650		4	_947969 _aPARTICIPACION POLITICA
650		4	_aESTADOS UNIDOS _942888
700			_93916 _aTsyvinski, Aleh
700	1		_968066 _aWerquin, Nicolas
773	0		_9166825 _oOP 234/2022/2 _tThe American Economic Review _w(IEF)103372 _x 0002-8282 _gv. 112, n. 2, February 2022, p. 689-719
942			_cART