000 01651nab a2200301 c 4500
999 _c145446
_d145446
003 ES-MaIEF
005 20220218133402.0
007 ta
008 220218t2021 gw ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040 _aES-MaIEF
_bspa
_cES-MaIEF
100 1 _969581
_aHavlik, Annika
245 0 _aElection cycles in European public procurement
_c Annika Havlik, Friedrich Heinemann and Justus Nover
260 _c2021
500 _aResumen.
504 _aBibliografía.
520 _aWe study the existence of election cycles in public procurement in the European Union. Along the procurement process, we separately analyze contract notices, contract awards, and project completions. We point out how these steps differ in their potential to address specific voter types. We argue that the award is particularly appealing for politicians. It allows them to please the award-winning firms' stakeholders and the spending decision becomes credible from the perspective of forward-looking voters. We find robust evidence for electioneering in contract notices and awards. The effect in awards is stronger for certain sub-categories like education and more visible projects.
650 4 _940436
_aCONTRATOS ADMINISTRATIVOS
650 4 _940499
_aCONCESIONES ADMINISTRATIVAS
650 4 _944787
_aGASTO PUBLICO
650 4 _943408
_aELECCIONES
650 4 _aVOTO
_955164
650 4 _aUNION EUROPEA
_948644
650 4 _aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
_947776
700 _952685
_aHeinemann, Friedrich
700 1 _969582
_aNover, Justus
773 0 _9166651
_oOP 207/2021/4
_tFinanzArchiv
_w(IEF)21244
_x 0015-2218
_gv. 77, n. 4, December 2021, p. 376-407
942 _cART