000 | 01651nab a2200301 c 4500 | ||
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999 |
_c145446 _d145446 |
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003 | ES-MaIEF | ||
005 | 20220218133402.0 | ||
007 | ta | ||
008 | 220218t2021 gw ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d | ||
040 |
_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF |
||
100 | 1 |
_969581 _aHavlik, Annika |
|
245 | 0 |
_aElection cycles in European public procurement _c Annika Havlik, Friedrich Heinemann and Justus Nover |
|
260 | _c2021 | ||
500 | _aResumen. | ||
504 | _aBibliografía. | ||
520 | _aWe study the existence of election cycles in public procurement in the European Union. Along the procurement process, we separately analyze contract notices, contract awards, and project completions. We point out how these steps differ in their potential to address specific voter types. We argue that the award is particularly appealing for politicians. It allows them to please the award-winning firms' stakeholders and the spending decision becomes credible from the perspective of forward-looking voters. We find robust evidence for electioneering in contract notices and awards. The effect in awards is stronger for certain sub-categories like education and more visible projects. | ||
650 | 4 |
_940436 _aCONTRATOS ADMINISTRATIVOS |
|
650 | 4 |
_940499 _aCONCESIONES ADMINISTRATIVAS |
|
650 | 4 |
_944787 _aGASTO PUBLICO |
|
650 | 4 |
_943408 _aELECCIONES |
|
650 | 4 |
_aVOTO _955164 |
|
650 | 4 |
_aUNION EUROPEA _948644 |
|
650 | 4 |
_aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS _947776 |
|
700 |
_952685 _aHeinemann, Friedrich |
||
700 | 1 |
_969582 _aNover, Justus |
|
773 | 0 |
_9166651 _oOP 207/2021/4 _tFinanzArchiv _w(IEF)21244 _x 0015-2218 _gv. 77, n. 4, December 2021, p. 376-407 |
|
942 | _cART |