000			01548nab a2200229 c 4500
999			_c145351 _d145351
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20220209124141.0
007			ta
008			220209t2021 ne ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_969542 _aNikolaou, Polyvios
245		0	_aMandatory binding arbitration _bavoiding stalemates over the tax chessboard _c Polyvios Nikolaou
260			_c2021
500			_aResumen.
520			_aThe resolution of tax treaty disputes under the Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) mechanism is inherently problematic. This article examines how the introduction of final-offer arbitration (FOA) can improve dispute resolution using a game-theoretical approach. It will be argued that arbitration introduces an element of finality that was demonstrably absent in the MAP while also contributing to the speedier resolution of disputes which is beneficial to all international stakeholders. After demonstrating the advantages of arbitration, the paper considers how its institutional design can be optimized in the tax context. It makes proposals regarding the publication of arbitral decisions to address concerns of countries that are still skeptical about whether or not to endorse it.
650			_aFISCALIDAD INTERNACIONAL _944303
650			_aTRATADOS INTERNACIONALES _948608
650		7	_aRESOLUCIONES EXTRAJUDICIALES DE CONFLICTOS _966265
650		4	_aARBITRAJE _928417
773	0		_9166491 _oOP 2141/2021/12 _tIntertax _w(IEF)55619 _x 0165-2826 _gv. 49, n. 12, December 2021, p. 974-985
942			_cART