000			02179nab a2200277 c 4500
999			_c145349 _d145349
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20220208135506.0
007			ta
008			220208t2022 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
245		0	_aUnderstanding cross-cultural differences in peer reporting practices _bevidence from tax evasion games in Moldova and France _c Rustam Romaniuc, Dimitri Dubois, Eugen Dimant, Adrian Lupusor & Valeriu Prohnitchi
260			_c2022
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aAuthorities rely on reports from private citizens to detect and enforce more than a trivial portion of effective law-breaking. The present article is the first to study the cultural aspect of peer reporting experimentally. By collecting data in a post-Soviet country (Moldova), we focus in particular on how the Soviet legacy of using citizens as private informants may have a long-lasting effect on their willingness to cooperate with state authorities. We then contrast those effects with peer reporting behavior in France, a Western society. Our results suggest that participants in Moldova view cooperation with authorities as less socially acceptable than their counterparts in France. Our results also suggest that participants in Moldova engage less frequently in peer reporting than individuals in France. However, we also find that less peer reporting does not necessarily imply less tax compliance. Participants in both countries exhibit very similar tax compliance rates. We explain the effect of peer reporting on tax compliance in Moldova using the country's past experience during the Soviet era, when being reported to authorities was common and carried grave consequences.
650		4	_937635 _aCOLABORACION TRIBUTARIA
650		4	_944029 _aEVASION FISCAL
650		4	_942842 _aDOBLE IMPOSICION
650		4	_941141 _aCONVENIOS
650		4	_967013 _aINFORMES PAÍS POR PAÍS
650		4	_aFRANCIA _944475
650		4	_952040 _aMOLDAVIA
700	1		_969541 _aRomaniuc, Rustam
773	0		_9166590 _oOP 1443/2022/1/2 _tPublic Choice _w(IEF)124378 _x 0048-5829 _gv. 190, n. 1-2, January 2022, p. 127-147
942			_cART