000			02070nab a2200265 c 4500
999			_c145342 _d145342
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20220208121642.0
007			ta
008			220208t2021 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_969538 _aElaoud, Assawer
245		0	_aInvestment efficiency, tax avoidance, and external audit _bevidence of European Companies _c Assawer Elaoud, Anis Jarboui
260			_c2021
500			_aResumen.
520			_aThis article looks at the impact of external audit and tax avoidance behavior on investment problems such as under-investment and over-investment. More specifically, this article adds value to the literature by examining how external audit moderates the relationship between business tax avoidance and investment problems. The authors employ a large sample of European companies listed in the STOXX Europe 600 index over the 2013–2017 period. This sample includes 9 sectors and 17 countries. The regression results show that tax avoidance is significantly negative in terms of investment efficiency and that it increases the over-investment problem. Indeed, when managers forgo investments that produce positive net present value through tax avoidance, companies could be exposed to a problem of over-investment. In addition, the results show that external auditors moderate the behavior of tax avoidance with regard to investment efficiency and over-investment. Audit quality, measured by three proxies, reduces agency costs and improves investment efficiency. These outcomes are robust in relation to other measurements of both investment efficiency and tax avoidance.
650		4	_aINVERSIONES EMPRESARIALES _943879
650		4	_aEFICIENCIA _943270
650		4	_aELUSION FISCAL _943410
650		4	_aAUDITORIA FISCAL _932216
650		4	_aINSPECCION TRIBUTARIA _941016
650		4	_aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS _947776
700	1		_969539 _aJarboui, Anis
773	0		_9166424 _oOP 235/2021/1 _tJournal of Taxation of Investments _w(IEF)51921 _x 0747-9115 _gv. 39, n. 1, Fall 2021, p. 27-48
942			_cART