000			01459nab a2200265 c 4500
999			_c145324 _d145324
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20220207130337.0
007			ta
008			220207t2021 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_969523 _aDoerr, Annabelle
245		0	_aCollaborative tax evasion in the provision of services to consumers _ba field experiment _cAnnabelle Doerr, Sarah Necker
260			_c2021
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aWe conduct a field experiment with sellers of home improvement services on two German online markets. We take the role of consumers and vary whether we request an invoice for the delivery of the service. In a market that allows anyone to sell anonymously, a willingness to evade is prevalent. In a market that keeps track of credentials, sellers are only willing to evade when a willingness to collude is signaled. The evasion discount is in most estimates not larger than the tax subsidy for legal demand. Evasion is unlikely to be beneficial for many consumers in our setting.
650		4	_aINDUSTRIA DE SERVICIOS _946586
650		4	_aIMPUESTOS _947460
650		4	_aEVASION FISCAL _944029
650		4	_aCONSUMIDORES _940657
650		4	_aALEMANIA _925193
700	1		_969524 _aNecker, Sarah
773	0		_9166409 _oOP 2135/2021/4 _tAmerican Economic Journal : Economic Policy _w(IEF)134825 _x 1945-7731 _gv. 13, n. 4, November 2021, p. 185-216
942			_cART