000			02186nab a2200289 c 4500
999			_c145274 _d145274
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20220126123759.0
007			ta
008			220126t2019 uk ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_969511 _aEmmenegger, Patrick
245		4	_aThe politics of inequality as organised spectacle _bwhy the Swiss do not want to tax the rich _c Patrick Emmenegger and Paul Marx
260			_c2019
500			_aDisponible también en formato electrónico.
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aIn 2015, Swiss voters had the opportunity to imposea tax on the superrich in a popular vote and there by fund are distributive policy. However,alarge majority voted against its seemingly obvious self-interest and rejected the tax. We propose an explanation for this puzzling outcome, bridging the usually separate behavioralist and institutionalist perspectives on the politics of inequality. We start from the observation that political economy tends to neglect processes of preference formation. Theorising preferences as socially constructed, we show that interest groups played a major role in shaping the outcome of the vote. Business frames were multiplied through allied parties and the media and had a major impact on individual voting behaviour. In addition, we demonstrate that interest groups representing business interests derive the content of their communication from business’s structurally privileged position in the capitalist economy. Specifically, creating uncertainty about possible perverse effects of government policies on jobs and growth is a powerful tool to undermine popular support. Frames based on this structural power ultimately explain why the Swiss refrained from ‘soaking the rich.’
650		4	_944024 _aRIQUEZA
650		4	_947319 _aRENTAS ALTAS
650			_aIMPUESTOS _947460
650		4	_947876 _aOPINION PUBLICA
650		4	_945087 _aGRUPOS DE INTERES ECONOMICO
650		4	_948486 _aSUIZA
700	1		_969512 _aMarx, Paul
773	0		_9166462 _oOP 1642/2019/1 _tNew political economy _w(IEF)125203 _x 1356-3467 _gv. 24, n. 1, February 2019, p. 103-124
942			_cART