000			01825nab a2200229 c 4500
999			_c144667 _d144667
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20210920185811.0
007			ta
008			210920t2021 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|spa d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100			_953437 _aLeibrecht, Markus
245			_aVeto players, market discipline, and structural fiscal consolidations _cMarkus Leibrecht, Johann Scharler
260			_c2021
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aBased on a sample of 16 Western OECD countries we show that although veto players with heterogeneous political preferences reduce the probability of a structural fiscal consolidation, the effect of veto players declines with greater financial market pressure, which we measure as the spread between the long-term government bond yield and the corresponding yield in a base country (either the United States or Germany). We proxy veto players with heterogeneous political preferences primarily by the political constraints index of Henisz (Econ Polit 12(1):1–31, 2000). Our findings support the view that, as long as government bond yield spreads are sufficiently narrow, financial market pressure exerts a disciplining effect on fiscal policy by counteracting the political deadlock resulting from veto players who obstruct structural fiscal consolidations. The mirror image of our finding is that financial market pressure exerts a more positive impact on the likelihood of a structural fiscal consolidation in political environments characterized by many heterogeneous veto players.
650		4	_948067 _aPOLITICA FISCAL
650		4	_940606 _aCONSOLIDACION
700	1		_961912 _aScharler, Johann
773	0		_9165656 _oOP 1443/2021/3/4 _tPublic Choice _w(IEF)124378 _x 0048-5829 _gv. 188, n. 3-4, September 2021, p. 361-384
942			_cART