000			01562nab a2200289 c 4500
999			_c144559 _d144559
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20210827130453.0
007			ta
008			210827t2021 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aEs-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_969188 _aCipullo, Davide
245		0	_aVoting systems and fiscal policy _bevidence from runoff and plurality elections _c Davide Cipullo
260			_c2021
500			_aDisponible también en formato electrónico.
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aThis paper compares policy outcomes under the runoff voting system and the plurality rule by exploiting the assignment of municipalities in Italy to different voting systems based on a population threshold. Mayors, who are the head of the local political power, are elected using a plurality rule in municipalities having fewer than 15,000 residents, while they are elected using a runoff system in municipalities above the threshold. Regression-discontinuity estimates show that municipalities under the runoff system spend 12 percent more than those under the plurality rule and that additional expenditures are not financed via higher taxation.
650		4	_948067 _aPOLITICA FISCAL
650		4	_932254 _aMUNICIPIOS
650		4	_943408 _aELECCIONES
650		4	_955362 _aSISTEMA ELECTORAL
650		4	_955164 _aVOTO
650		4	_947518 _aITALIA
650		4	_947776 _aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
773	0		_9165527 _oOP 233/2021/2 _tNational Tax Journal _w(IEF)86491 _x 0028-0283 _gv. 74, n. 2, June 2021, p. 347-376
942			_cART