000			01768nab a2200277 c 4500
999			_c144524 _d144524
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20210824124300.0
007			ta
008			210824t2021 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_969170 _aGootjes, Bram
245		0	_aDo fiscal rules constrain political budget cycles? _c Bram Gootjes, Jakob de Haan & Richard Jong-A-Pin
260			_c2021
500			_aDisponible también en formato electrónico.
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aWe ask whether fiscal rules constrain incumbents from using fiscal policy tools for reelection purposes. Using data on fiscal rules provided by the IMF for a sample of 77 (advanced and developing) countries over the 1984–2015 period, we find that strong fiscal rules dampen political budget cycles. Our results are remarkably robust against inclusion of media freedom and the level of government debt as explanatory variables. Furthermore, we find a strong effect of fiscal rules in, amongst others, countries with fewer veto players, left-wing governments, established democracies, and more globalized economies. In addition, the effect of fiscal rules on political budget cycles seems to be stronger after the global financial crisis, reflecting post-crisis expansion in the number of countries with strong fiscal rules, notably in the European Union.
650		4	_942375 _aDERECHO TRIBUTARIO
650		4	_948067 _aPOLITICA FISCAL
650		4	_948131 _aPRESUPUESTOS
650		4	_954423 _aESTABILIDAD PRESUPUESTARIA
700			_920171 _aHaan, Jakob de
700			_953960 _aJong A Pin, Richard
773	0		_9165472 _oOP 1443/2021/188/1/2 _tPublic Choice _w(IEF)124378 _x 0048-5829 _gv. 188, n. 1-2, July 2021, p. 1-30
942			_cART