000			01729nab a2200313 c 4500
999			_c144279 _d144279
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20210610105343.0
007			ta
008			210610t2021 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_951430 _aManiquet, François
245		0	_aWell-being, poverty, and labor oncome taxation _btheory and application to Europe and the United States _c François Maniquet, Dirk Neumann
260			_c2021
500			_aResumen.
520			_aIn a model where agents differ in wages and preferences over labor time–consumption bundles, we study labor income tax schemes that alleviate poverty. To avoid conflict with individual well-being, we require redistribution to take place between agents on both sides of the poverty line provided they have the same labor time. This requirement is combined with efficiency and robustness properties. Maximizing the resulting social preferences under incentive compatibility constraints yields the following evaluation criterion: tax schemes should minimize the labor time required to reach the poverty line. We apply this criterion to European countries and the United States.
650		4	_948256 _aRENDIMIENTOS DE TRABAJO
650			_aIMPUESTOS _947460
650		4	_947569 _aJORNADA DE TRABAJO
650		4	_933421 _aBIENESTAR SOCIAL
650		4	_948219 _aREDISTRIBUCION
650		4	_950200 _aRENTA
650		4	_aPOBREZA _948038
650		4	_aESTADOS UNIDOS _942888
650		4	_aEUROPA _943946
650		4	_947776 _aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
700	1		_969056 _aNeumann, Dirk
773	0		_9165169 _oOP 2136/2021/2 _tAmerican Economic Journal : Microeconomics _w(IEF)64890 _x 1945-7669 _gv. 13, n. 2, May 2021, p. 276-310
942			_cART