000			01609nab a2200277 c 4500
999			_c144098 _d144098
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20210520104922.0
007			ta
008			210520t2021 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_957910 _aRaudla, Ringa
245		0	_aStructural budget balance as a fiscal rule in the European Union _bgood, bad, or ugly? _c Ringa Raudla and James W. Douglas
260			_c2021
500			_aDisponible también en formato electrónico.
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aThe EU's Fiscal Compact requires member states to legislate structural budget balance rule(s) (SBR). We use elite interviews and government documents from Austria, Ireland, and Portugal to assess the extent to which SBRs are perceived to have resulted in improved accountability, coordination, and credible commitment on the part of elected officials. We find that establishing the SBRs in legislation has not resulted in domestic ownership on the part of the member states. Furthermore, SBRs do not appear to have improved accountability due to questions about their accuracy. There is some evidence that SBRs aid finance ministries' coordination efforts.
650		4	_941566 _aCUENTAS PRESUPUESTARIAS
650		4	_954423 _aESTABILIDAD PRESUPUESTARIA
650		4	_930755 _aARMONIZACION
650		4	_931085 _aARMONIZACION FISCAL
650		4	_932229 _aUNION EUROPEA
700	1		_948841 _aDouglas, James W.
773	0		_9164874 _oOP 1716/2021/1 _tPublic Budgeting and Finance _w(IEF)90019 _x 0275-1100 _gv. 41, n. 1, Spring 2021, p. 121-141
942			_cART