000			01519nab a2200253 c 4500
999			_c143723 _d143723
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20210311125430.0
007			ta
008			210311t2021 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_959322 _aJohnston, Andrew
245		0	_aUnemployment insurance taxes and labor demand _bquasi-experimental evidence from administrative data _c by Andrew C. Johnston
260			_c2021
500			_aResumen.
520			_aTo finance unemployment insurance, states raise payroll tax rates on employers who engage in layoffs. Tax rates are, therefore, highest for firms after downturns, potentially hampering labor-market recovery. Using full-population, administrative records from Florida, I estimate the effect of these tax increases on firm behavior leveraging a regression kink design in the tax schedule. Tax hikes reduce hiring and employment substantially, with no effect on layoffs or wages. The results imply unanticipated costs of the financing regime which reduce the optimal benefit by a quarter and account for 12 percent of the unemployment in the wake of the Great Recession.
650		4	_948379 _aSEGURO DE DESEMPLEO
650		4	_944260 _aFINANCIACION
650		4	_948454 _aSOCIEDADES
650			_aIMPUESTOS _947460
650		4	_954834 _aINCREMENTO
650		4	_97978 _aIMPOSICION OPTIMA
773	0		_9164491 _oOP 2135/2021/1 _tAmerican Economic Journal : Economic Policy _w(IEF)134825 _x 1945-7731 _gv. 13, n. 1, February 2021, p. 266-293
942			_cART