000			01454nab a2200265 c 4500
999			_c143563 _d143563
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20210210135423.0
007			ta
008			210210t2021 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_957191 _aBierbrauer, Felix
245			_aPolitically feasible reforms of nonlinear tax systems _c Felix J. Bierbrauer, Pierre C. Boyer, Andreas Peichl
260			_c2021
500			_aResumen.
520			_aWe study reforms of nonlinear income tax systems from a political economy perspective. We present a median voter theorem for monotonic tax reforms, reforms so that the change in the tax burden is a monotonic function of income. We also provide an empirical analysis of tax reforms, with a focus on the United States. We show that past reforms have, by and large, been monotonic. We also show that support by the median voter was aligned with majority support in the population. Finally, we develop sufficient statistics that enable to test whether a given tax system admits a politically feasible reform.
650		4	_950200 _aRENTA
650			_aIMPUESTOS _947460
650		4	_948426 _aSISTEMA FISCAL
650			_aREFORMA _910750
650			_aESTADOS UNIDOS _942888
700	1		_961509 _aBoyer, Pierre C.
700	1		_957924 _aPeichl, Andreas
773	0		_9164290 _oOP 234/2021/1 _tThe American Economic Review _w(IEF)103372 _x 0002-8282 _gv. 111, n. 1, January 2021, p. 153-191
942			_cART