000			01616nab a2200253 c 4500
999			_c143523 _d143523
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20221110162247.0
007			ta
008			210204t2020 uk ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_968715 _aValido, Jorge
245	1	0	_aLarge infrastructure investments _bfinancing mechanisms and incentives in decentralised countries _c Jorge Valido
260			_c2020
500			_aDisponible también en formato electrónico.
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aInfrastructure services crucially affect competitiveness and efficiency. They are essential but they usually require important amounts of public funds. In decentralised countries, regional governments cannot usually afford large infrastructure projects, so co‐financing with the central government is required. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the influence of the central government financing mechanisms on the contract offered by the regional government for the construction, maintenance and operation of the infrastructure. We prove that if the central government uses certain financing mechanisms (total cost coverage), the regional government may have no incentives to offer an efficient contract to the firm.
650		4	_aINVERSIONES EN INFRAESTRUCTURA _945090
650		4	_aINVERSIONES PUBLICAS _945097
650		4	_aCOOPERACIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA _953912
650		4	_aDESCENTRALIZACION ADMINISTRATIVA _942578
773	0		_9164224 _oOP 1472/2020/4 _tFiscal Studies _w(IEF)55561 _x 0143-5671 [papel] _gv. 41, n. 4, December 2020, p. 905-921
942			_cART