| 000 | 01628nab a2200301 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 999 |
_c143446 _d143446 |
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| 003 | ES-MaIEF | ||
| 005 | 20210127122619.0 | ||
| 007 | ta | ||
| 008 | 210127t2020 gw ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d | ||
| 040 |
_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF |
||
| 100 | 1 |
_968672 _aKasamatsu, Satoshi |
|
| 245 | 2 |
_aA citizen-candidate model of tax competition with interdependent preferences _c Satoshi Kasamatsu, Taku Masuda, Hikaru Ogawa |
|
| 260 | _c2020 | ||
| 500 | _aDisponible también en formato electrónico. | ||
| 500 | _aResumen. | ||
| 504 | _aBibliografía. | ||
| 520 | _aIn a citizen-candidate model of tax competition, this study describes the emergence of a policymaker (political leader) that has a hostile or altruistic stance toward neighboring countries. The results show that (i) when countries competing for mobile capital have similar positions on the import/export of capital, an altruistic citizen will be elected as the political leader, and (ii) when their capital positions differ, a citizen that has malicious preferences can become the representative of the country. | ||
| 650 | 4 |
_940318 _aCOMPETENCIA FISCAL NOCIVA |
|
| 650 | 4 |
_948073 _aPOLITICOS |
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| 650 | 4 |
_943408 _aELECCIONES |
|
| 650 | 4 |
_955164 _aVOTO |
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| 650 | 4 |
_947776 _aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS |
|
| 700 | 1 |
_968673 _aMasuda, Taku |
|
| 700 | 1 |
_953171 _aOgawa, Hikaru |
|
| 773 | 0 |
_9164088 _oOP 207/2020/4 _tFinanzArchiv _w(IEF)21244 _x 0015-2218 _gv. 76, n. 4, December 2020, p. 313-328 |
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| 856 | _uhttps://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/a-citizen-candidate-model-of-tax-competition-with-interdependent-preferences-101628fa-2020-0011?no_cache=1 | ||
| 942 | _cART | ||