000			01333nab a2200217 c 4500
999			_c143324 _d143324
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20201209134228.0
007			ta
008			201209t2020 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|spa d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_965702 _aLockwood, Benjamin B.
245		0	_aOptimal income taxation with present bias _c Benjamin B. Lockwood
260			_c2020
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aWork often entails up-front effort costs in exchange for delayed benefits, and mounting evidence documents present bias over effort in the face of such delays. This paper studies the implications for the optimal income tax. Optimal tax rates are computed for present-biased workers who choose multiple dimensions of labor effort, some of which occur prior to compensation. Present bias reduces optimal tax rates, with a larger effect when the elasticity of taxable income is high. Optimal marginal tax rates may be negative at low incomes, providing an alternative, corrective rationale for work subsidies like the Earned Income Tax Credit.
650		4	_97978 _aIMPOSICION OPTIMA
650		4	_947776 _aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
773	0		_9163938 _oOP 2135/2020/4 _tAmerican Economic Journal : Economic Policy _w(IEF)134825 _x 1945-7731 _gv. 12, n. 4, November 2020, p. 298-327
942			_cART