000 02311nab a2200349 c 4500
999 _c142936
_d142936
003 ES-MaIEF
005 20201008132849.0
007 ta
008 201008t2020 ne ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040 _aES-MaIEF
_bspa
_cES-MaIEF
041 _aeng
100 1 _964199
_aBaerentzen, Susi Hjorth
245 0 _aLegitimacy in international tax law-making
_bcan the OECD remain the guardian of open tax norms?
_c Susi Baerentzen, Arjan Lejour and Maarten van 't Riet
_hElectrónico
260 _c2020
500 _aDisponible únicamente en formato electrónico.
500 _aResumen.
520 _aThis article analyses the recent rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union in two Danish cases and examines their possible impact on international tax avoidance. These rulings regard limitations of tax benefits related to cross-border dividend payments resulting from the interposition of holding companies in the European Union. From a legal perspective, the authors conclude that the rulings demonstrate the alignment of international tax policies to combat tax avoidance between the European Union and the OECD. The concerted action between the two is implemented by the economic test to counter abusive legal holding structures. From a quantitative perspective, the rulings limit the potential for multinational enterprises to lower their tax burden considerably. The worldwide average potential gain from treaty shopping is reduced from 5.6% to 4.5% when the EU Member States cannot be used on treaty shopping routes. With more countries, the combat against tax avoidance is more effective. However, the fact that some countries have a standard withholding tax rate of zero per cent hampers the combat.
650 4 _aSOCIEDADES DE INVERSION
_948460
650 4 _aHOLDINGS
_945443
650 4 _aOPERACIONES TRANSFRONTERIZAS
_962796
650 4 _aDIVIDENDOS
_942810
650 4 _aINTERES
_947502
650 4 _aIMPUESTOS
_947856
650 4 _aDINAMARCA
_942730
650 4 _aTRIBUNAL DE JUSTICIA DE LAS COMUNIDADES EUROPEAS
_948611
650 4 _aUNION EUROPEA
_948644
650 4 _aJURISPRUDENCIA
_947570
700 1 _925552
_aLejour, Arjan M.
700 1 _966931
_aRiet, Maarten van't
773 0 _9163482
_oWTJ/2020/2
_tWorld Tax Journal
_w(IEF)62814
_gv. 12, n. 2, 2020
942 _cRE