000			01585nab a22002417c 4500
999			_c142750 _d142750
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20200922174806.0
007			ta
008			200922s2020 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041	0		_aeng
245			_aTaxing hidden wealth _bthe consequences of US enforcement initiatives on evasive foreign accounts _c by Niels Johannesen... [et al.]
260			_c2020
504			_aBibliografía
520			_aIn 2008, the IRS initiated efforts to curb the use of offshore accounts to evade taxes. This paper uses administrative microdata to examine the impact of enforcement efforts on taxpayers' reporting of offshore accounts and income. We find that enforcement caused approximately 50,000 individuals to disclose offshore accounts with a combined value of about $100 billion. Most disclosures happened outside offshore voluntary disclosure programs by individuals who never admitted prior noncompliance. Disclosed accounts were concentrated in countries often characterized as tax havens. Enforcement-driven disclosures increased annual reported capital income by $2–$4 billion, corresponding to $0.6–$1.2 billion in additional tax revenue.
650		4	_aESTADOS UNIDOS _942888
650		4	_aPARAISOS FISCALES _947950
650		4	_aEVASION FISCAL _944029
650		4	_aINTERCAMBIO DE INFORMACION TRIBUTARIA _947499
650		4	_aRENTAS EXTRANJERAS _948268
773	0		_9163208 _oOP 2135/2020/3 _tAmerican Economic Journal : Economic Policy _w(IEF)134825 _x1945-7731 _gvolume 12, number 3, august 2020, p. 312-346
942			_cART