000			01883nab a2200301 c 4500
999			_c142407 _d142407
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20200824120148.0
007			ta
008			200824t2020 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100	1		_968168 _aMace, Christopher
245		0	_aMarijuana taxation and imperfect competition _c Chistopher Mace, Elena Patel and Nathan Seegert
260			_c2020
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aWe investigate the tax implications of the new recreational marijuana industry in the United States, which reached $9 billion in 2017. We exploit administrative data from Washington State to evaluate market conduct, and we estimate the elasticity of supply to be 1.46. In addition, we conduct a survey of marijuana producers and retailers in Colorado, Oregon, and Washington, calculating the elasticity of demand to be -1.84. We use these estimates to determine how much of the tax burden is borne by consumers. The answer depends on market conduct. In perfectly competitive markets, producers pay slightly more of the tax than consumers, but, in a monopoly market, consumers would pay most of the tax. Additionally, we calculate that the change in deadweight loss due to the tax is $63 million per year, or 48 percent of total marijuana tax revenues in 2015. This calculation, however, depends critically on estimates of consumption externalities.
650		4	_933421 _aIMPUESTOS
650		4	_942925 _aESTUPEFACIENTES
650		4	_940216 _aCOMPETENCIA DESLEAL
650		4	_940658 _aCONSUMO
650		4	_947378 _aINGRESOS FISCALES
650		4	_947736 _aESTADOS UNIDOS
700	1		_965969 _aPatel, Elena Spatoulas
700			_964204 _aSeegert, Nathan
773	0		_9162565 _oOP 233/2020/2 _tNational Tax Journal _w(IEF)86491 _x 0028-0283 _gv. 73, n. 2, June 2020, p. 545-592
942			_cART