000			01741nab a2200277 c 4500
999			_c142405 _d142405
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20200824115149.0
007			ta
008			200824t2020 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
245		0	_aTaxing the potency of sin goods _bevidence from recreational cannabis and liquor markets _c Bejamin Hansen, Keaton Miller, Boyoung Seo and Caroline Weber
260			_c2020
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aCannabis is legal to purchase for over 28 percent of U.S. citizens. A central argument used in public campaigns for cannabis legalization has focused on the tax revenue that legal cannabis markets could generate. Recently, some policy makers and politicians have debated switching from traditional ad valorem taxes to taxes on potency, aiming to reduce the potential externalities associated with highly potent products. In this paper, we construct a theoretical model to predict the implications of a potency-based tax in an environment with market power. We then estimate the demand for cannabis potency based on administrative records of sales and potency from Washington state. We finish by conducting counterfactual analyses comparing revenue and potency outcomes from potency-based taxes versus the traditional price-based taxes.
650		4	_933421 _aIMPUESTOS
650		4	_942925 _aESTUPEFACIENTES
650		4	_932308 _aBEBIDAS ALCOHOLICAS
650		4	_940658 _aCONSUMO
650		4	_947378 _aINGRESOS FISCALES
650		4	_947736 _aESTADOS UNIDOS
700	1		_961444 _aHansen, Benjamin
773	0		_9162565 _oOP 233/2020/2 _tNational Tax Journal _w(IEF)86491 _x 0028-0283 _gv. 73, n. 2, June 2020, p. 511-544
942			_cART