000			01866nab a2200301 c 4500
999			_c142386 _d142386
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20200820132605.0
007			ta
008			200820t2020 gw ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100	1		_927712 _aMarchese, Carla
245		0	_aTax preparers and tax evasion _bpunishing tax payers or tax preparers? _c Carla Marchese and Andrea Venturini
260			_c2020
500			_aDisponible también en formato electrónico.
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aWe focus on amoral taxpayers who are aware of having a biased perception of the audit probability but are unable to correct such bias without the help of a tax preparer. The tax preparation market is characterized by imperfect competition. Profit maximization implies that the suggested correction of the evasion amount is partial and the report is not aligned with the one authored by an unbiased amoral taxpayer. Assisted returns are still more compliant than the self-made unbiased ones when the detection probability is overestimated, while the opposite occurs in the case of underestimation. Tax preparers thus appear to exert an ambiguous role on compliance, fostering a median stance. This provides an explanation for the ambivalent attitudes of tax authorities towards tax preparers. Sanctions on taxpayers are more effective than sanctions on tax assistants in deterring tax evasion.
650		4	_931085 _aEVASION FISCAL
650		4	_aELUSION FISCAL _943410
650		4	_940318 _aASESORES FISCALES
650		4	_932216 _aAUDITORIA FISCAL
650		4	_941016 _aINSPECCION TRIBUTARIA
650		4	_947776 _aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
700	1		_968152 _aVenturini, Andrea
773	0		_9162410 _oOP 207/2020/2 _tFinanzArchiv _w(IEF)21244 _x 0015-2218 _gv. 76, n. 2, June 2020, 191-214
942			_cART