000			01504nab a2200265 c 4500
999			_c142385 _d142385
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20200820131512.0
007			ta
008			200820t2020 gw ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100	1		_938075 _aItaya, Jun Ichi
245		0	_aAre moderate Leviathans harmful to tax coordination? _c Jun-Ichi Itaya and Chikara Yamaguchi
260			_c2020
500			_aDisponible también en formato electrónico.
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aThis study investigates how the sustainability of partial tax coordination among a subset of countries (i.e., a tax union) is affected when the governments' objective function is moderate Leviathan in that policymakers are neither entirely benevolent nor fully self-interested. We show that partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail either when moderate-Leviathan-type governments become more revenue-maximizing Leviathans or when more wasteful government expenditure is engaged in. Nevertheless, the well-being of the residents in the member countries of the tax union unambiguously deteriorates, while that in nonmember countries is ambiguous.
650		4	_931085 _aARMONIZACION FISCAL
650		4	_940318 _aCOMPETENCIA FISCAL NOCIVA
650		4	_947776 _aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
700	1		_955560 _aYamaguchi, Chikara
773	0		_9162410 _oOP 207/2020/2 _tFinanzArchiv _w(IEF)21244 _x 0015-2218 _gv. 76, n. 2, June 2020, 165-190
942			_cART