| 000 | 02528nab a2200349 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 999 |
_c142358 _d142358 |
||
| 003 | ES-MaIEF | ||
| 005 | 20200818120120.0 | ||
| 007 | ta | ||
| 008 | 200818t2020 uk ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d | ||
| 040 |
_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF |
||
| 041 | _aeng | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_968129 _aLesage, Dries |
|
| 245 | 4 |
_aThe BRICs and international tax governance _bthe case of automatic exchange of information _c Dries Lesage, Wouter Lips and Mattias Vermeiren |
|
| 260 | _c2020 | ||
| 500 | _aResumen. | ||
| 504 | _aBibliografía. | ||
| 520 | _aThis article investigates the BRICs’ involvement in the adoption of Automatic Exchange of Information (AEoI) by the G20 and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as a major breakthrough in the global fight against tax evasion. Our main questions concern the BRICs’ willingness to accept AEoI, and their agreement to the Western-dominated OECD as its institutional forum. First, we examine the domestic drivers for BRICs’ participation, as their statist model of capitalism reveals strong disincentives to join this regime and the fact that the budgetary consequences of the global financial crisis were less severe than in Western states. We argue that their agreement on AEoI results more from their persistent balance-ofpayments vulnerability to illicit capital than from fiscal weakness, while also discussing the possibilities for mock compliance. Second, we review the role of the non-reciprocal US foreign account tax compliance act (FATCA) in shaping the BRICs’ preference for a multilateral AEoI-regime centred around the OECD’s Common Reporting Standard (CRS). Last, we show that the BRICs’ acceptance of the OECD resulted from pragmatic interests and receiving ownership over the process, together with the absence of coercive mechanisms within the CRS-regime that could fundamentally undermine their sovereignty in this domain. | ||
| 650 | 4 |
_947499 _aINTERCAMBIO DE INFORMACION TRIBUTARIA |
|
| 650 | 4 |
_aEVASION FISCAL _944029 |
|
| 650 | 4 |
_aELUSION FISCAL _943410 |
|
| 650 | 4 |
_aCONTROL _940745 |
|
| 650 | 4 |
_aINDIA _945694 |
|
| 650 | 4 |
_aRUSIA _948329 |
|
| 650 | 4 |
_aBRASIL _933442 |
|
| 650 | 4 |
_948505 _aSUDAFRICA |
|
| 650 | 4 |
_aCHINA _933911 |
|
| 700 | 1 |
_968130 _aLips, Wouter |
|
| 700 | 1 |
_968131 _aVermeiren, Mattias |
|
| 773 | 0 |
_9162664 _oOP 1642/2020/5 _tNew political economy _w(IEF)125203 _x 1356-3467 _gv. 25, n. 5, October 2020, p. 715-733 |
|
| 856 | _uhttps://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13563467.2019.1584168 | ||
| 942 | _cART | ||