000 02319nab a2200301 c 4500
999 _c142354
_d142354
003 ES-MaIEF
005 20200818101620.0
007 ta
008 200818t2020 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040 _aES-MaIEF
_bspa
_cES-MaIEF
041 _aeng
100 1 _950178
_aPeralta, Susana
245 0 _aWho seeks reelection
_blocal fiscal restraints and political selection
_c Susana Peralta, João Pereira dos Santos
260 _c2020
500 _aDisponible también en formato electrónico.
500 _aResumen.
504 _aBibliografía.
520 _aThis paper analyzes the consequences of local fiscal autonomy with respect to political selection. We propose a model of political careers wherein the decisions to become candidates and to seek reelection are both endogenous. Private-sector aptitude and political ability are private information; the latter is revealed to the incumbent during her first period in office. We show that, following an unanticipated reduction in the returns from holding office, incumbents with high market ability are more likely to refrain from running for office again than their lower-ability counterparts. We test that prediction using an unexpected reduction in the upper bound of the municipal property tax rate, announced by Portugal’s prime minister in July 2008, just 15 months before the local elections. We rely on a comprehensive data set for all Portuguese mainland municipalities for the 2005 and 2009 elections, including the characteristics of the municipalities and individual mayors. We employ a difference-in-differences strategy to show that affected mayors—those who were forced to reduce the property tax rate, and thus faced a sharp tax revenue decline—are less likely to seek reelection. This effect is driven by high-professional-status incumbents.
650 4 _945217
_aHACIENDAS LOCALES
650 4 _948620
_aTRIBUTOS LOCALES
650 4 _932229
_aAUTONOMIA TRIBUTARIA
650 _aESTADOS UNIDOS
_942888
650 4 _947776
_aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
700 1 _968126
_aSantos, João Pereira dos
773 0 _9162749
_oOP 1443/2020/184/1/2
_tPublic Choice
_w(IEF)124378
_x 0048-5829
_gv. 184, n.1-2, July 2020, p.105-134
856 _uhttps://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11127-019-00702-7.pdf
942 _cART