000			01723nab a2200289 c 4500
999			_c142350 _d142350
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20200817124738.0
007			ta
008			200817t2020 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
245			_aTax-exempt lobbying _bcorporate philanthropy as a tool for political influence _c by Marianne Bertrand, Matilde Bombardini, Rymond Fisman and Francesco Trebbi
260			_c2020
500			_aDisponible también en formato electrónico.
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía
520			_aWe explore the role of charitable giving as a means of political influence. For philanthropic foundations associated with large US corporations, we present three different identification strategies that consistently point to the use of corporate social responsibility in ways that parallel the strategic use of political action committee (PAC) spending. Our estimates imply that 6.3 percent of corporate charitable giving may be politically motivated, an amount 2.5 times larger than annual PAC contributions and 35 percent of federal lobbying. Absent of disclosure requirements, charitable giving may be a form of corporate political influence undetected by voters and subsidized by taxpayers.
650		4	_951452 _aFUNDACIONES BENÉFICAS
650		4	_947460 _aIMPUESTOS
650		4	_944038 _aEXENCIONES TRIBUTARIAS
650		4	_948047 _aPOLITICA
650		4	_aESTADOS UNIDOS _942888
700	1		_95386 _aBertrand, Marianne
773	0		_9162654 _oOP 234/2020/7 _tThe American Economic Review _w(IEF)103372 _x 0002-8282 _gv. 110, n. 7, July 2020, p. 2065-2102
856			_uhttps://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/aer.20180615
942			_cART