000			01400nab a2200241 c 4500
999			_c142235 _d142235
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20200729103227.0
007			ta
008			200729s2020 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041	0		_aeng
100	1		_968067 _aDovis, Alessandro
245	0	0	_aFiscal rules, bailouts, and reputation in federal governments _c Alessandro Dovis and Rishabh Kirpalani
260			_c2020
504			_aBibliografía
520			_aExpectations of transfers by central governments incentivize overborrowing by local governments. In this paper, we ask if fiscal rules can reduce overborrowing if central governments cannot commit. We study a model in which the central government’s type is unknown and show that fiscal rules increase overborrowing if the central government’s reputation is low. In contrast, fiscal rules are effective in lowering debt if the central government’s reputation is high. Even when the central government’s reputation is low, binding fiscal rules will arise in the equilibrium of a signaling game.
650		4	_aTRIBUTOS LOCALES _948620
650		4	_aPOLITICA FISCAL _948067
700	1		_968068 _aKirpalani, Rishabh
773	0		_9162359 _oOP 234/2020/3 _tThe American Economic Review _w(IEF)103372 _x 0002-8282 _gvolume 110, number 3, march 2020, p. 860-888
856			_uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w23942.pdf
942			_cART