000			01618nab a2200265 c 4500
999			_c142231 _d142231
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20200803104149.0
007			ta
008			200728s2020 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041	0		_aeng
100	1		_964621 _aSachs, Dominik
245	0	0	_aNonlinear tax incidence and optimal taxation in general equilibrium _c Dominik Sachs, Aleh Tsyvinski, Nicolas Werquin
260			_c2020
504			_aBibliografía
520			_aWe study the incidence of nonlinear labor income taxes in an economy with a continuum of endogenous wages. We derive in closed form the effects of reforming nonlinearly an arbitrary tax system, by showing that this problem can be formalized as an integral equation. Our tax incidence formulas are valid both when the underlying assignment of skills to tasks is fixed or endogenous. We show qualitatively and quantitatively that contrary to conventional wisdom, if the tax system is initially suboptimal and progressive, the general‐equilibrium “trickle‐down” forces may raise the benefits of increasing the marginal tax rates on high incomes. We finally derive a parsimonious characterization of optimal taxes.
650		4	_aIMPUESTOS _947460
650		4	_946552 _aINCIDENCIA Y TRASLACION
650		4	_97978 _aIMPOSICION OPTIMA
650		4	_947776 _aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
700			_93916 _aTsyvinski, Aleh
700	1		_968066 _aWerquin, Nicolas
773	0		_9162407 _oOP 232/2020/2 _tEconometrica : Journal of the Econometric Society _w(IEF)21086 _x 0012-9682 [papel] _gvol. 88, nº 2, march 2020, p. 469-493
942			_cART