| 000 | 01377nab a2200241 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 999 |
_c141805 _d141805 |
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| 003 | ES-MaIEF | ||
| 005 | 20200213103033.0 | ||
| 007 | ta | ||
| 008 | 200213t2020 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d | ||
| 040 |
_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF |
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| 041 | _aeng | ||
| 100 | 1 |
_967836 _aFarhi, Emmanuel |
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| 245 | 0 |
_aOptimal taxation with behavioral agents _c by Emmanuel Farhi and Xavier Gabaix |
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| 260 | _c2020 | ||
| 500 | _aResumen. | ||
| 504 | _aBibliografía. | ||
| 520 | _aThis paper develops a theory of optimal taxation with behavioral agents. We use a general framework that encompasses a wide range of biases such as misperceptions and internalities. We revisit the three pillars of optimal taxation: Ramsey (linear commodity taxation to raise revenues and redistribute), Pigou (linear commodity taxation to correct externalities), and Mirrlees (nonlinear income taxation). We show how the canonical optimal tax formulas are modified and lead to novel economic insights. We also show how to incorporate nudges in the optimal taxation framework, and jointly characterize optimal taxes and nudges. | ||
| 650 | 4 |
_933516 _aIMPOSICION OPTIMA |
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| 650 |
_aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS _947776 |
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| 700 | 1 |
_950525 _aGabaix, Xavier |
|
| 773 | 0 |
_9161835 _oOP 234/2020/1 _tThe American Economic Review _w(IEF)103372 _x 0002-8282 _g v. 110, n. 1, January 2020, p. 298-336 |
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| 942 | _cART | ||