000			01986nab a2200289 c 4500
999			_c141445 _d141445
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20200731105629.0
007			ta
008			191127s2019 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
245		4	_aThe effects of decentralization on special interest groups _cRobert F. Salvino, Gregory M. Randolph, Geoffrey K. Turnbull, Michael T. Tasto
260			_c2019
500			_aDisponible también en formato electrónico.
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aIt is well established in the literature that the number of interest group organizations varies across countries and states, with economic freedom and other institutional factors playing important roles in economic growth and prosperity. At the same time, the literature offers little empirical evidence of the influence of institutions on interest group behavior. This study presents new evidence on the extent to which institutional structure, in particular state and local governmental fiscal decentralization, promotes or hinders interest group formation. Expenditure decentralization, more so than revenue decentralization, appears to constrain the number of industry-type groups while having little effect on social-type groups in US states. The results provide further evidence of the importance of institutional quality and structure across states and suggest important directions for future research.
650		4	_942579 _aDESCENTRALIZACION FISCAL
650		4	_945087 _aGRUPOS DE INTERES ECONOMICO
650		4	_942578 _aDESCENTRALIZACION ADMINISTRATIVA
650		4	_aESTADOS UNIDOS _942888
650			_aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS _947776
700	1		_967669 _aSalvino, Robert F.
773	0		_9161384 _oOP 1443/2019/181/3/4 _tPublic Choice _w(IEF)124378 _x 0048-5829 _g v. 181, n. 3-4, December 2019, p. 191-213
856			_uhttps://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11127-019-00651-1.pdf
942			_cART