000			01721nab a2200265 c 4500
999			_c141287 _d141287
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20191015153856.0
007			ta
008			191015s2019 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100	1		_959937 _aLeguizamon, J. Sebastian
245		0	_aParty cues, political trends and fiscal interactions in the United States _c J. Sebastian Leguizamon and Casto Martin Montero Kuscevic
260			_c2019
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aRecent theoretical and empirical research has suggested that similarities in party affiliations across space will alter voters' comparisons, thus influencing fiscal policy mimicking. We employ a two‐regime spatial panel data model applied to U.S. state governors from 1970 to 2012, and find rather weak empirical evidence of influence of political party affiliations in fiscal yardstick competition. Our observed cross‐state interdependence in fiscal policies suggests voters may not weigh party affiliation heavily in their measure of comparative quality, treating each incumbent individually and independently. Incumbents strategically choose policy accordingly. This provides indirect support for the median voter theorem, in which incumbents' objective function is to maximize votes, independent of political affiliation.
650		4	_948067 _aPOLITICA FISCAL
650		4	_947972 _aPARTIDOS POLITICOS
650		4	_955164 _aVOTO
650		4	_aESTADOS UNIDOS _942888
700	1		_967574 _aMontero Kuscevic, Casto Martin
773	0		_9161223 _oOP 1634/2019/4 _tContemporary Economic Policy _w(IEF)574 _x 1074-3529 [papel] _g v. 37, n. 4, October 2019, p. 600-620
942			_cART