000			02073nab a2200277 c 4500
999			_c141264 _d141264
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20230614154528.0
007			ta
008			191009s2019 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
245		0	_aDeterring property tax delinquency in Philadelphia _ban experimental evaluation of nudge strategies _c Michael Chirico, Rober Inman, Charles Loeffer, John MacDonald and Holger Sieg
260			_c2019
500			_aResumen.
500			_aBibliografía.
520			_aMunicipal governments commonly confront the problem of tardy or delinquent property tax payments. We implement an experiment in property tax collection for tardy taxpayers in the City of Philadelphia for the calendar year 2015. The experiment sent one of seven reminder letters to the tardy taxpayers, testing the efficacy of a simple reminder; two alternative reminders stressing economic sanctions; and four alternative reminders emphasizing either that taxpayers receive neighborhood services or city-wide services for their tax payments, that most of their neighbors pay their taxes on time, or that as a citizen in a democracy it is a civic duty to pay taxes on time. Compliance behaviors were compared to a holdout sample that received no reminder letter. The most effective letters were those that threatened an economic sanction for continued non-compliance. These letters were particularly cost-effective in raising additional city revenues. There was no evidence that those receiving a reminder for calendar year 2015 improved their tax compliance behavior in calendar year 2016.
650		4	_948620 _aTRIBUTOS LOCALES
650		4	_948163 _aPROPERTY TAX
650		4	_956582 _aDEUDORES Y ACREEDORES
650		4	_97307 _aADMINISTRACION TRIBUTARIA
650		4	_947813 _aINFRACCIONES Y SANCIONES TRIBUTARIAS
650			_aESTADOS UNIDOS _942888
700	1		_965064 _aChirico, Michael
773	0		_9161109 _oOP 233/2019/3 _tNational Tax Journal _w(IEF)86491 _x 0028-0283 _g v. 72, n. 3, September 2019, p. 479-506
942			_cART