000			01561nab a2200277 c 4500
999			_c141256 _d141256
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20191008165552.0
007			ta
008			191008s2019 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100	1		_967556 _aNaritomi, Joana
245		0	_aConsumers as tax auditors _c by Joana Naritomi
260			_c2019
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aTo investigate the enforcement value of third-party information on potentially collusive taxpayers, I study an anti-tax evasion program that rewards consumers for ensuring that firms report sales and establishes a verification system to aid whistle-blowing consumers in Sao Paulo, Brazil (Nota Fiscal Paulista). Firms reported sales increased by at least 21 percent over 4 years. The results are consistent with fixed costs of concealing collusion, increased detection probability from whistle-blower threats, and with behavioral biases associated with lotteries amplifying the enforcement value of the program. Although firms increased reported expenses, tax revenue net of rewards increased by 9.3 percent.
650		4	_946528 _aIMPUESTOS INDIRECTOS
650		4	_943410 _aELUSION FISCAL
650		4	_946896 _aINFORMACION TRIBUTARIA
650		4	_932216 _aAUDITORIA FISCAL
650		4	_941016 _aINSPECCION TRIBUTARIA
650		4	_aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS _947776
773	0		_9161148 _oOP 234/2019/9 _tThe American Economic Review _w(IEF)103372 _x 0002-8282 _g v. 109. n. 9, September 2019, p. 3031-3072
942			_cART