000			01903nab a2200301 c 4500
999			_c141145 _d141145
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20190923194929.0
007			ta
008			190923s2019 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_cES-MaIEF _aES-MaIEF _bspa
041			_aspa
100	1		_aLee, Soomi _967500
245		0	_aPolitical economy of the parcel tax in California school districts _c Soomi Lee
260			_c2019
500			_aDisponible también en formato electrónico en la Biblioteca del IEF.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aThis article examines the effect of home price distribution on the likelihood of parcel tax adoption in California school districts. A parcel tax is a regressive tax imposed as the same amount per unit of property regardless of property values and requires a two-thirds supermajority vote to be adopted. Despite the growing role that local parcel taxes have in funding public education, it has not been fully understood how their regressive nature influences adoption. I argue that because the regressive tax imposes different marginal property tax rates for voters, the distribution of home prices within a district determines the likelihood of parcel tax adoption. Using the Heckman selection models with California school district–level data, I find that a large gap in home values within a district significantly lowers the likelihood of parcel tax adoption.
650		4	_933596 _aCENTROS DOCENTES
650		4	_948169 _aPROPIEDAD INMOBILIARIA
650		4	_aIMPUESTOS LOCALES _946373
650		4	_aPOLITICA ECONOMICA _948066
650		4	_aIMPOSICION OPTIMA _97978
650		4	_aCALIFORNIA _94957
650		4	_aESTADOS UNIDOS _942888
773	0		_9161022 _oOP 581/2019/5 _tPublic Finance Review _w(IEF)21382 _x 0048-5853 _g v. 47, n. 5, September 2019, p. 864-892
856			_uhttps://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1091142119847674
942			_cART