000			02146nab a2200289 c 4500
999			_c141117 _d141117
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20201009160525.0
007			ta
008			190918t2019 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _cES-MaIEF
100	1		_964917 _aAaskoven, Lasse
245		0	_aRedistributing under fiscal constraint _bpartisanship, debt, inequality and labour market regulation _c Lesse Aaskoven
260			_c2019
500			_aDisponible también en formato electrónico en la Biblioteca del IEF.
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aLabour market regulation varies significantly, both within and between developed democracies. While there has been extensive research and debate in economics on the consequences of labour market regulation, the political causes for levels and changes in labour market regulation have received less scholarly attention. This article investigates a political economy explanation for differences in labour market regulation building on a theoretical argument that labour regulation can be used as a nonfiscal redistribution tool. Consequently, partisanship, the demand for redistribution and government budget constraint jointly determine whether labour market regulation will increase or decrease.Consistent with this argument, panel analyses from 33 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development countries reveal that labour market regulation increases under left-wing governments that face increased market inequality and high government debt.
650		4	_947734 _aMERCADO DE TRABAJO
650		4	_942072 _aDERECHO DEL TRABAJO
650		4	_aRENTA _950200
650			_aREDISTRIBUCION _948219
650			_aDEUDA PUBLICA _942647
650			_aDESIGUALDAD _942588
773	0		_9161015 _oOP 1793/2019/3 _tJournal of Public Policy _w(IEF)17584 _x 0143-814X _g v. 39, issue 3, September 2019, p. 423-441
856			_uhttps://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/0FB76F23FEA42E6B012539FF8046B4C2/S0143814X18000193a.pdf/redistributing_under_fiscal_constraint_partisanship_debt_inequality_and_labour_market_regulation.pdf
942			_cART