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| 003 | ES-MaIEF | ||
| 005 | 20230614145252.0 | ||
| 007 | ta | ||
| 008 | 190829s2019 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d | ||
| 040 |
_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF |
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| 041 | _aeng | ||
| 245 | 0 |
_aCasting a wider tax net _bexperimental evidence from Costa Rica _c by Anne Brockmeyer, Spencer Smith, Marco Hernández and Stewart Kettle |
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| 260 | _c2019 | ||
| 500 | _aResumen. | ||
| 504 | _aBibliografía. | ||
| 520 | _aThe majority of firms in developing countries are informal, yet even among registered firms, tax filing rates are low. We argue that non-filing of taxes among registered firms constitutes an important intermediate form of informality, which can be tackled cost-effectively. Using a randomized experiment in Costa Rica, we show that credible enforcement emails increased the tax payment rate (amount) by 3.4 p.p. (US$15) among previously non-filing firms. Emails that highlight third-party reports of a firm's transactions further increased compliance. The effect persisted over two years, and treated firms became more likely to report transactions with other firms, facilitating future tax enforcement. | ||
| 650 | 4 |
_917027 _aSOCIEDADES |
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| 650 | 4 |
_940658 _aEMPRESAS |
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| 650 | 4 |
_944933 _aIMPUESTOS |
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| 650 | 4 |
_941766 _aDECLARACIONES TRIBUTARIAS |
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| 650 | 4 |
_941661 _aCUMPLIMIENTO FISCAL |
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| 650 | 4 |
_941385 _aCOSTA RICA |
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| 700 | 1 |
_967473 _aBrockmeyer, Anne |
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| 773 | 0 |
_9160976 _oOP 2135/2019/3 _tAmerican Economic Journal. Economic Policy _w(IEF)134825 _x 1945-7731 _g v. 11, n. 3, August 2019, p. 55-87 |
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| 942 | _cART | ||