000			01995nab a2200313 c 4500
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20190809102840.0
007			ta
008			190809s2019 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100	1		_967387 _aGayle, George Levy
245		0	_aOptimal taxation, marriage, home production and family labor supply _c George - Levy Gayle, Andrew Shepard
260			_c2019
500			_aDisponible también en formato electrónico en la Biblioteca del IEF.
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aAn empirical approach to optimal income taxation design is developed within an equilibrium collective marriage market model with imperfectly transferable utility. Taxes distort time allocation decisions, as well as marriage market outcomes, and the within household decision process. Using data from the American Community Survey and American Time Use Survey, we structurally estimate our model and explore empirical design problems. We allow taxes to depend upon marital status, with the form of tax jointness for married couples unrestricted. We find that the optimal tax system for married couples is characterized by negative jointness, although the welfare gains from jointness are modest. These welfare gains are then shown to be increasing in the gender wage gap, with taxes here, as in the case of gender based taxation, providing an instrument to address within household inequality.
650			_aRENTA _950200
650			_aIMPUESTOS _947460
650		4	_948642 _aUNIDAD FAMILIAR
650		4	_947704 _aMATRIMONIO
650		4	_97978 _aIMPOSICION OPTIMA
650		4	_947776 _aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
700	1		_926769 _aShephard, Andrew
773	0		_9160795 _oOP 232/2019/1 _tEconometrica : Journal of the Econometric Society _w(IEF)21086 _x 0012-9682 [papel] _g v. 87, n. 1, January 2019, p. 291-326
856			_uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.3982/ECTA14528
942			_cART
999			_c140965 _d140965