000			02102nab a2200313 c 4500
999			_c140932 _d140932
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20230613190106.0
007			ta
008			190718s2019 ne ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100	1		_967377 _aMelkonyan, Satenik
245		0	_aFlow-through holding companies in light of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive _bthe thin line between tax planning and tax abuse _c Satenik Melkonyan & Filip Schade
260			_c2019
500			_aResumen.
520			_aThis article analyses a tax structuring technique which can, even in the post-BEPS era, lead to unfavourable results from a fiscal perspective. First, it describes a disputed tax planning scheme. In particular, the authors show that by using partially tax-exempt companies under Article 2(a)(iii) of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive as flowthrough holding companies, the general partner of the latter can achieve a fully tax-free repatriation of profits within the EU. Subsequently, the article addresses the question as to whether this result can be tackled by currently available legal anti-abuse means (section 3). The authors suggest that the taxpayer-friendly settled case law of the EU Court of Justice (ECJ) makes it almost impossible for current anti-abuse rules to cover this technique. Finally, the authors recommend that the personal scope of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive be limited, which should provide an effective solution for such structures, while also being suitable for political consensus among the Member States (section 4).
650		4	_945443 _aHOLDINGS
650		4	_944380 _aSUCURSALES
650		4	_947460 _aIMPUESTOS
650		4	_948027 _aPLANIFICACION FISCAL INTERNACIONAL
650		4	_954389 _aABUSO DEL DERECHO
650		4	_954712 _aPREVENCIÓN
650		4	_aUNION EUROPEA _948644
650		4	_943410 _aELUSION FISCAL
650		4	_942805 _aLEGISLACION COMUNITARIA
700	1		_966710 _aSchade, Filip
773	0		_9160689 _oOP 2141/2019/6/7 _tIntertax _w(IEF)55619 _x 0165-2826 _g v. 47, Issue 6/7, June / July 2019, p. 590-608
942			_cART