000			01535nab a2200253 c 4500
999			_c140892 _d140892
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20230613184420.0
007			ta
008			190712s2019 us ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100	1		_967370 _aYang, Lang Kate
245		0	_aNot all state authorizations for municipal bankruptcy are equal _bimpact on state borrowing costs _c Lang (Kate) Yang
260			_c2019
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aThis paper investigates the impact of state authorizations of municipal bankruptcy on state government borrowing costs. The credit markets may perceive bankruptcy authorizations as credit enhancing because states signal no implicit guarantee of local debt. However, the markets may charge a risk premium if authorizations could cause strategic uses of bankruptcy, widespread filings, and contagion. Analyses using 1975–1997 state borrowing-cost estimates show that different authorization regimes have differing effects. Specifically, authorizations conditional on state intervention are associated with a reduction in state borrowing cost. Analyses of a 2010 Rhode Island legislation using state bond data provide similar findings.
650		4	_945222 _aHACIENDAS MUNICIPALES
650		4	_931111 _aQUIEBRA
650		4	_944156 _aFEDERALISMO FISCAL
650			_aESTADOS UNIDOS _942888
773	0		_9160685 _oOP 233/2019/2 _tNational Tax Journal _w(IEF)86491 _x 0028-0283 _g v. 72, n. 2, June 2019, p. 435-464
942			_cART