000			01453nab a2200277 c 4500
003			ES-MaIEF
005			20190513142512.0
007			ta
008			190513t2019 gw ||||| |||| 00| 0|eng d
040			_aES-MaIEF _bspa _cES-MaIEF
041			_aeng
100	1		_967239 _aObara, Takuya
245		0	_aDifferential income taxation and Tiebout sorting _c Takuya Obara
260			_c2019
500			_aDisponible también en formato electrónico en la Biblioteca del IEF.
500			_aResumen.
504			_aBibliografía.
520			_aThis study examines optimal nonlinear income taxes when individuals differ in their preference for a public good and labor productivity. We consider two regions, of which one provides a higher-quality public service than the other, thus inducing individuals to »vote with their feet.« The government implements a region-specific income tax schedule to reflect the difference in benefits from the public service between the regions in the tax system. We demonstrate that the optimal structure of the tax system is dramatically reformed, depending on whether individuals can move or not.
650		4	_97978 _aIMPOSICION OPTIMA
650		4	_948391 _aSERVICIOS PUBLICOS
650		4	_948201 _aTRABAJO
650		4	_948148 _aPRODUCTIVIDAD
650		4	_947776 _aMODELOS ECONOMETRICOS
773	0		_9160254 _oOP 207/2019/1 _tFinanzArchiv _w(IEF)21244 _x 0015-2218 _g v. 75, n. 1, January 2019, p. 1-38
942			_cART
999			_c140580 _d140580